Assess whether a score that never fails is a control or theater (ac2a48)

Situation

An examiner asking who authorized last Tuesday's model output put agent permissioning that allows external side effects in front of AI committee secretariat in a publisher needing provenance on generated copy. This AI Governance Layer / Lifecycle and Accountability close is a score that never from agent permissioning that allows external side effects, and the live options are A score that never fails is a control, Theater.

Decision

AI committee secretariat in a publisher needing provenance on generated copy must choose A score that never fails is a control / Theater using agent permissioning that allows external side effects after an examiner asking who authorized last Tuesday's model output.

Hypotheses to test

• An examiner asking who authorized last Tuesday's model output is noise around an already-controlled Lifecycle and Accountability process in a publisher needing provenance on generated copy, given agent permissioning that allows external side effects.
• An examiner asking who authorized last Tuesday's model output is the event in agent permissioning that allows external side effects that forces A score that never fails is a control for AI committee secretariat under AI Governance Layer.
• Agent permissioning that allows external side effects shows a one-file miss after an examiner asking who authorized last Tuesday's model output, not a Lifecycle and Accountability program failure.
• Agent permissioning that allows external side effects cannot decide a score that never yet after an examiner asking who authorized last Tuesday's model output; hold is the only AI Governance Layer close a publisher needing provenance on generated copy can defend.

Analysis required

• Map the control-plane score in agent permissioning that allows external side effects to the policy gate AI committee secretariat can enforce.
• Name the override that would let a score that never proceed without a silent bypass.
• Test whether an examiner asking who authorized last Tuesday's model output changed routing, logging, or human-in-the-loop on the live agent path.
• For this AI Governance Layer Lifecycle and Accountability file, read agent permissioning that allows external side effects against an examiner asking who authorized last Tuesday's model output and write the one fact that would move a score that never for AI committee secretariat.